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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Were the Industrial Commission's findings of the
occurrence of a compensable "industrial accident" within the
meaning c* Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, and of no
pre-existing impairment or condition, arbitrary and capricious?

iii

DETERMINITIVE STATUTES
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated:
Industrial Accidents To Be Paid

Compensation for

Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured, and the dependents of any such employee who is
killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident
was r^t purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation
tor lcjs sustained...

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Nature of the Case
This is a petition for review of the final order of
The Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utan,
which order is the Denial of Motion for Review, R. at 432.
Said

order,

in denying

Petitioner's Motion

for Review,

affirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order of Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm,
dated November 5, 1984, that Respondent Kimbal suffered an
injury by "accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment" with Petitioner, and should be compensated pursuant to the terms of Section 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated.
Disposition in the Administrative Hearing
On February 5, 1985, the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed a prior Order of an
Administrative Law Judge that Respondent Kimbal had suffered
an injury, within the meaning of Section 35-1-45 Utah Code
Annotated, while employed by Petitioner.
the

Board

of

Review

adopted

Conclusions of Law and Order

the

In so affirming,

Findings

previously

of

Fact,

entered, R. at

411-415.
Statement of the Facts
Respondent Bret Kimbal (hereinafter Kimbal) was a
full-time employee of Kimbal Storm Windows, a family business, during 1982, Testimony of Bret Kimbal, R. at 38,39;
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Testimony of his father, Donald Kimbal, R. at 292,293. This
was storm window

installation work.

Kimbal also worked

parttime as a doorman and bouncer for Petitioner Bigfoots,
Inc.,

a

beer

bar

and

night

(hereinafter Bigfoots), R. at 26.

club

located

in

Ogden

Part of Kimbal's regular

duties as an employee of Bigfoots was to stock the beer
cooler with beer at the end of the evening, Testimony of
Bret Kimbal, R. at 27-28.
On June 19, 1982, while performing his usual beerloading

activities

for Bigfoots, Kimbal

injured his back, R. at 30-31.

claims

to have

Kimbal testified that he

jumped out of bed the next day and when his leg hit the
floor, it gave out, R. at 32.

He consulted a chiropractor,

Dr. Lane, the next work day, Monday, June 21, 1982, R. at
33.

Dr. Lane's treatments did not relieve Kimbalfs pain

satisfactorily, so he went to see his family physician, Dr.
Hyde, on June 28, 1982, R. at 34; Testimony of Dr. Hyde, R.
at 118.

Not satisfied with Dr. Hyde's conservative treat-

ment, Kimbal went to see his other family physician, Dr.
Paul, R. at 35.

Dr. Paul referred Kimbal to Dr. Church, a

neurosurgeon, R. at 36.

Conservative treatment under Dr.

Church, including physical therapy and traction, did not
work out, and Kimbal underwent surgery for a herniated disc
after a CAT scan and myelogram confirmed this, R. at 36.
Kimbal did not work at either job from June 19, 1982 until
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November 1, 1982, when he resumed working in the family
storm window business in a supervisory capacity.
Kimbal applied for worker's compensation benefits,
alleging that he had injured his back while loading beer
cases for Bigfoots on June 19, 1982, R. at 5-6.

An initial

hearing on Kimbalfs claim was held on March 7, 1984, at
which

only

Kimbal

Administrative

Law

testified,
Judge

found

R.
that

at
an

23-46.

The

accident

had

occurred, and referred the case to a medical panel for a
disability evaluation, R. at 45.
The medical panel consisted of Dr. John M. Bender
only, Testimony of Dr. Bender, R. at 180.

In a letter to

Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm, R. at 89-91, Dr.
Bender testified that he had reviewed Dr. Church's surgical
report, the summary of the March 7, 1984 hearing, and a preoperative CT scan of Kimbal fs low back, R. at 89.
Bender

did

not

undertake

to

obtain

any

other

Dr.

medical

records, such as those of Dr. Lane, Dr. Hyde or Dr. Paul, R.
at 183-184. Basing his opinion on only limited information,
Dr. Bender concluded, inter alia, that Kimbal had no previously existing condition which contributed

to a physical

impairment, and that there was no pre-existing impaired condition, R. at 90.
At a subsequent
1984, Dr. Bender

hearing, held on September 27,

testified

that his earlier conclusions
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could have been affected if he had known about Kimbalfs having both experienced prior lower back pain and seeking and
receiving chiropractic treatment for it, R. at 185-186. Dr.
Bender

also

testified

his

conclusions

might

have

been

affected if he had been made aware of a May or early June,
1982 problem Kimbal had with his back, R. at 191-192.
Both Dr. Bender and Dr. Church agreed that Kimbalfs
ruptured

disc could

have been caused

by any number of

events, including every day occurrences.

See generally,

testimony of Dr. Bender, R. at 179-199; testimony of Dr.
Church, R. 49-71.
Kimbal did in fact, have a prior low back injury
for which he sought help.

Dr. Jack R. Lane, a chiropractor,

testified at the September

27, 1984 hearing that he had

treated Kimbal in April of 1981 for "acute lumbo-sacral
strain," R. at 130, which had been triggered by Kimbalfs
simply reaching down to pick up a bar of soap, R. at 131.
Dr. Lane took X-rays, which revealed that "the left ilium
had been rotated posteriorally and inferiorally," R. at 131,
lines 22-23.

Kimbal complained, at that time, of low back

pain and pain down the legs, R. at 130-132.
Dr. Lane again saw Kimbal, after his alleged accident at Bigfoots, on June 22, 1982, R. at 132.

Kimbal com-

plained of similar symptoms to those complained of in April,
1981, R. at 133.

In fact, Dr. Lane testified that "the left
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hip had rotated again."
added).

R. at 133, lines 24-25 (emphasis

Dr. Lane testified that on June 22, 1982, Kimbal

did not know the cause of his back pain, R. at 134, and that
he made a specific note of this, R. at 338.

On his next

visit, June 23, 1982, Kimbal informed Dr. Lane that he might
have hurt his back at Bigfoots, R. at 135.

Dr. Lane agreed

with Drs. Bender and Church that Kimbal's injury could have
been caused when he jumped out of bed on June 20, 1982, R.
at 137.
Dr. Oliver Wendell Hyde, Jr., also testified at the
September 27, 1984 hearing, R. at 109-127.

He testified

that he examined Kimbal on June 28, 1982, at which time
Kimbalfs complaint was of low back pain, R. at 118.

Kimbal

did not mention an industrial injury at Bigfoots, as indicated by the absence of any business record of Dr. Hyde
showing an accident report, R. at 118-119.

Kimbal did not

complain of leg pain to Dr. Hyde, R. at 121.
At the September 27, 1984 hearing, Patrick McGuire,
a police officer

and part-time bouncer at Bigfoots with

Kimbal, testified that Kimbal had complained to him in late
May of 1982 about hurting his back while working in the family business, R. at 150, and that Kimbal complained again a
week later about back pain, R. at 151.

Another fellow

bouncer, one "Tiny" (Donald Pearson) testified that Kimbal
had complained of slipping and falling off a ladder at work
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and hurting his back, R. at 222.

Kimbal never mentioned to

Tiny that he hurt his back lifting a case of beer, R. at
228.
The Administrative Law Judge, after the September
27, 1984 hearing, adopted the findings of the medical panel
as to both disability rating and any pre-ex:sting condition,
R. at 413-414, despite the testimony of irs. Bender and
Church that Kimbal never told them of either prior low back/
leg pain or Dr. Lane's X-rays and treatment of the same in
April of 1981.

Bigfoots filed a Motion for Review of the

decision of the Administrative Law Judge, R. at 417-418,
which Motion was denied

by the Industrial Commission on

February 5, 1985, R. at 432-433.

Bigfoots then filed a

Petition for Review in this court on February 22, 1985, R.
at 443-444.
SUMMARY OR ARGUMENT
That the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
that there was an industrial "accident," within the meaning
of Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, was arbitrary and
capricious.

Counsel will argue that nothing in the nature

of an accident occurred.

Counsel will also argue that the

recommendation of the medical panel was arbitrary and capricious, so that, in the alternative to an outright reversal
of the decision of the Industrial Commission, this court
should remand the case for further medical panel proceedings
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in light of the evidence of Kimbal's pre-existing back condition.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
THAT AN INDUSTRIAL OCCIDENT HAD OCCURRED,
ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
In reviewing findings by the Industrial Commission,
the scope of inquiry of the Supreme Court is whether those
findings are arbitrary and capricious, i.e. wholly without
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion, or without
any evidence to support them.

Moyes v. State of Utah, 7

U.A.R. 39, No. 19236, April 5, 1985; Billings Computer Corp.
v

* Tarango, 674 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1983); Pittsburgh Testing

Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983); Sabofs
Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P. 2d 888 (Utah 1981).

It is

submitted that such is the a se here.
In the Monfredi ca5.e, this Court reviewed a series
of back injury cases in which it had determined the meaning
of the word
Annotated.
occurred
Industrial

"accident" under Section 35-1-45, Utah Code
This Court held that whether an "accident" had

is

a

question

Commission,

of

law

to

be

see also, Pintar

decided
v.

Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963).
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by

the

Industrial

Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah 1982) , is a case on point.

Prior to going to the

store on June 5, 1979, defendant Sabo was performing a usual
job duty, to wit:

loading some merchandise into his service

bus from the warehouse.

As he prepared to lift a box of

twelve clock radios, he experienced back pain.

The next

day, he was diagnosed, at a local hospital, as suffering
from a herniated disc.

He sought chiropractic care because

he could not afford surgery.

642 P. 2d 722, at 723.

Sabo

also had a prior history of back pain, having slipped and
fallen in 1951 while working in a mine.
see a chiropractor periodically.

This caused him to

Sabo also developed neck

and shoulder pain, and took steroid shots.

642 P.2d 722, at

723.
Following a hearing on December 10, 1979, the administrative law judge found that no "accident" had occurred.
The case was then referred to a medical panel, consisting of
one doctor, who found that there was no evidence of a preexisting condition and that Sabo had a permanent physical
impairment

resulting

entirely

from his "accident".

The

administrative law judge adopted all of the medical panel
report.

642 P.2d 722, at 724.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, observing:
Accident has been broadly defined as
"an unanticipated, unintended occurrence
different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of
events".
Carling
v.
Industrial
-8-

Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P. 2d 202
(1965).
The accident must result in an
injury which is causally related to the
work being done. Painter Motor Co. v.
Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980); Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission, 617 P. 2d 693
(Utah 1980).
The mere showing of an
injury does not ipso facto mean that a
compensable accident has occurred.
642
P.2d 722, at 725.
After discussing a number of prior decisions, the
Sabo court held:
...There is nothing in the doctor's evaluation which would justify a change from
the initial decision that no "accident"
occurred. The mere fact that defendant's
impairment resulted (in the words of Dr.
Moraberger) "entirely from the incident
which he alleges to" should not imply
that a compensable accident has occurred,
as defined in this opinion. It appears
to be mere coincidence that defendant's
injury or malfunction occurred at work.
642 P.2d 722, at 726.
Similarly, in the present case, there is no evidence of an "accident," i.e. of an unanticipated, unintended
occurrence.

As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, Kimbal

was performing his normal, usual duty of stocking the beer
cooler when his back hurt him.

This was something that he

did at the end of each night on which he worked at Bigfoots.
A year earlier, he had injured his back while routinely
bending over to pick up a bar of soap off the shower floor,
Testimony of Dr. Lane, R. at 130-131.

Additionally, Kimbal

had been in an automobile accident in 1979, suffering a
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whiplash injury, and complained to Dr. Lane of neck problems
"for years," R. at 132.

All of these factors together with

the medical testimony that almost anything can cause a disc
to rupture, combine to lead to one conclusion - that it was
purely coincidental that Kimbal hurt his back at Bigfoots.
The Finding by the Industrial Commission that a compensable
"accident" occurred, is, therefore, c.bitary and capricious.
POINT II.
THE
MEDICAL
PANEL'S
FINDINGS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
Dr.

Bender

relied

only

on

limited

ARE

evidence

in

arriving at his conclusions, said evidence being only Dr.
Church's surgical report, a preoperative CT scan of the low
back, and an interview of Mr. Kimbal.
Report, R. at 89.

See Medical Panel

He did not undertake to obtain any

records other than those supplied by the administrative law
judge, R. at 183. Dr. Bender admitted that, in terms of any
prior or pre-existing condition,

(#; 4,5, and 6) of his

report, R. at 90), a previous injur/ could be significant
and that it might have been detected by a careful reading of
the X-rays taken by Dr. Lane, R. at 186.

He also testified

that he could not tell when the disc herniation initially
started, as it had already been remedied surgically when he
examined Mr. Kimbal, R. at 189.

Dr. Church, the surgeon,

also testified that he could not t^ll exactly when the her-
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niation occurred, R. at 164, 167, 171.
mentioned

Additionally, as

in the Statement of Facts, there was evidence

adduced from Patrick McGuire and Donald Pearson, that Kimbal
had complained of low back pain to them prior to his alleged
accident.
Thus, it is apparent

that Dr. Bender's Medical

Panel Report, findings #4, 5 and 6, are arbitrary and capricious because they were not based upon all available information and, apparently, Kimbal withheld deliberately from
them the information about his 1981 injury and treatment.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, this Court
should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission,
or, in the alternative, remand for further medical panel
proceedings to determine the effect of Kimbal's pre-existing
condition upon his injury.

DATED this

r

^^~day of

6UA^^IA

, 1985.

MARQUAPDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

MARTIN W. CUSTEN
Attorney for Petitioner
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
T2lephone: 801-621-3662
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
* * * * * * * * * * * *
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I hereby certify that on this

i 7

\J$

- ^

da

y

of

August, 1985, I mailed four true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing Petitioner's Brief, postage prepaid, to :
Stephen W. Farr
Attorney for Respondent Kimbal
205 26th Street, Suite 34
Ogden, UT 84401
Ralph Finlayson
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Sale Lake City, UT 84114.

MARTIN WTCUSTEN
Attorney for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 83000961

BRET KIMBALL,

*
Applicant

vs.
BIGFOOT'S INCORPORATED
A UTAH CORPORATION,
(UNINSURED),

*
*
*

DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*
*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On or about November 5, 1984,, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about November 7, 1984,, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendant by and through their attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Facts and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The Commission
of the opinion
the Administrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDLRED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of November 5, 1934, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

-tit
j£> ATTEST:

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

d a y of F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 5 .

L i n d a J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

///
//
\J

Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF TTTAn
Case No. 83000961

BRET KIMBAL,
Applicant,

vs.
BIGFOOTfS, INCORPORATED,
a UTAH CORPORATION,
(uninsured)
Defendants•

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FIND! ,GS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ORDER

HEARINGS:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 7,
1984, at 1:00 p.m.

BEFORE:

Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Steven W.
Farr.
The defendants were represented by Ray Stoddard.

HEARING ON
OBJECTIONS:

McKay-Dee Hospital, 3939 Harrison Blva., Room El,
Level B, Ogden, Utah on September 27, 1984 at 10:00
p.m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of
the Commission.

BEFORE:

Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represei»ted by Steven W.
Farr.
The defendants were represented by David J. Knowlton,
Attorney at Law.

The original order was entered setting forth the facts in this case
and finding that the applicant was injured during the course of his employment
with the defendant company and that the incident was an accident, as defined
by the Workmen's Compensation Act.

BRET E. KIMBAL
ORDER
PAGE TWO

The Order further'required the payment of meJical bills, to date, and
ordered the defendants to pay $3,810.50 for temporary t^tal disability
compensation and further referred the matter to a medical panel. The order
was entered against Brill Sevy, dba Bigfoot's, an uninsured.
The defendants
and produced subsequent
in fact, a corporation
judge*s order of August

objected to the order being entered against Brill Sevy
evidence indicating that the employe^, Bigfoot's, was,
and the interim order was amended accordingly by the
28, 1984.

The defendants further objected to the order, stating that subsequent
discovered evidence would indicate that the applicant may have been injured on
another job. By letter, dated August 28, 1984, the administrative law judge
permitted the reopening of the case for taking of additional testimony and
allowed that further testimony to be introduced at a subsequent hearing on the
objections to the medical panel.
The medical panel returned itfs report, copies of which were
circulated to all of the parties. The defendants objected to that report, so
the matter involving the objections and the reopening of the case for
additional testimony was set in Ogden for September 27, 1984.
—
"
"
7
At
the
subsequent hearing, the applicants objected to the
introduction of additional testimony concerning the conditions under which the
applicant was injured and further objected to the defendants1 production of
medical witnesses. The objections were overruled and all of the evidence
tendered by both sides was received.
As to the defendants* contention that the applicant was not hurt on
the job, the defendants introduced evidence of other employees who indicated
that they had never heard the applicant complain about an injury. One witness
indicated that the applicant handled the beer cases effectively and walked
normal, but did say his back was hurting while lifting the Deer, although he
never did say that he hurt his back on the job. Another witness stated that
the applicant had complained earlier about his back being sore and that he had
hurt his back working in his father's business when he had slipped off of a
ladder. The applicant denied ever injuring himself in a fall from a ladder in
his father's business.
On the night of the injury, the applicant had
mentioned something about being afraid that his ladder out on the truck might
be stolen.
The applicant reiterated the events that transpired at the time of
his back injury on June 19, 1 Q ^
The defendant also called the applicant's
family practitioner who indicated that the applicant had an appointment on
June 28f 1982r afc which t\mQ b* complained of a low back pain, but did not
mention an iTirinsfrH A! F^ Hftfif .. No x-rays were taken because there was no
outward evidence of a herniated disc, but the doctor gave the applicant a
muscle relaxant and back exercises. On^October 6, 1982, the applicant came^in

BRET E. KIMBAL
ORDER
PAGE THREE

defendants ^Iso called the applicant* s chiropractor who testified that he
treated the applicant on April 15, 1981 for an acute lumbosacral strain, with
some radiation into uoth legs, which happened when the applicant was reaching
over to pick up a bar of soap. The applicant had six (6) treatments for that
problem. The record of the chiropractor also indicated that the applicant had
had a whiglarsh IT> -iQ7Qt yhi^h hid given h*™ ^ ^ o pr?blems.L The next visit to
the chiropractor was June 22. 1982f when the applicant indicated that he woke
1
,lC_WifH >>*«* Ha^k hurting hut did not 1m QV ™ h Y ^_nT1 T " n o 23, 1982, the next
day, the applicant was treated by the "chiropractor again and, this time, he
indicated that ha probably hurt his back lifting a keg of beer at Bigfoot's^)
The treating physician, Dr. Church, a neurosurgeon, was also called
to testify and confirmed that the applicant had complained about back pains
and left leg pains, giving a history of back injury at his work at Bigfoot's.
Dr. Church agreed with Dr. Bender's medical panel report.
The applicant's father, who runs a business known as Kimbal Storm
Windows, acknowledged that the applicant was employed by him during 1982 on a
full-time basis until he was injured June 19, 1982. The father denied the
applicant >ffl<? injured r^ ^ <» jnh af qny timer but did mention that when Bret
Kimbal came to work on the Monday following June 19. 1982, his back was sore
and he was dragging his leg.
He verified that the applicant could not
continue his work for him because"of his back condition.
Although the defendants introduced evidence concerning statements
made by the applicant that he had injured his back previously and that he had
complained about his back hurting previously, there Vfts no evidence to refute
the applicants claim that he^jtfas—inspired while Tiffing a1 Veg—e£—beer at
• Riftfoofs on June 19, 1982 as alleged by the aoplican^.
By ^t? f n f p t—^ke
applicant* s r-taims—rre entiled fn the benefit nf f^o doubt unless there _is
convincing evidence ho the contrary.^ Tho prhnj r\j strati ve law .judge cannot find
any convincing evidence to the mnfrrary—«nH J
therefore, finds that the"
app 1 icant was injui/ed on his job at Bigfoofs on June 19f "Qg? fsr ^hieh he
required medical treatment and was required to discontinue work for a period
of time.
There was no evidence which substantially conflicted with the medical
panel and the medical panel verified its position as set forth in its report,
which was alsc supported by Dr. Church. The medical panel report was received
in evidence and the administrative law judge adopts the findings of the
medical panel as his own, which are as follows:
1.

There is medically demonstrable causal relationship between the
applicant's residual symptoms and signs and the industrial
accident.
The
applicant
was
found
to
have
herniated
inter-vertebral
disc
following
his
industrial
injury
and
subsequently underwent surgery for this problem. His residual
symptoms and signs are secondary to this injury.
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The applicant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of
the industrial injury from the date of the injury until November
1, 1982. At that time he began doing some supervisory work not
requiring any lifting. It is noted that his operating surgeon
did not release him to return to work until February 1983, at
that point with lifting restrictions of approximately 40 pounds.
The applicants total physical impairment resulting from the
industrial injury is now 9% total percentage and 7% combined
percentage. These percentages are arrived at using the Guides
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as follows: Loss of
flexion of the lumbosacral spine equal 1%, loss of extension of
the lumbosacral spine equal 1%, loss of flexion of the left hip
equal 2%, which is total 4% of the whole man due to loss of
motion. There is 5% physical impairment secondary to operation
on intervertebral disc lesion.

4.

All of the permanent physical impairment could be attributed to
the applicant's industrial injury.
The applicant has no previously
existing
contributes to a physical impairment.

condition

which

There is no pre-existing impaired condition.
Surgery and post-operative therapy
applicant's industrial accident.
8.

were

necessitated

by

the

The applicant should not require further medical or surgical
treatment as a result of his injury. He has been instructed to
limit stooping and lifting and if he lives within these
limitations, further complications requiring treatment are not
reasonably anticipated.

As set forth in the interim order, the applicant is entitled to
temporary total disability compensation in the amount of $3,810.50 and payment
of medical expenses, which at the time of that order were $6,114.76. The
applicant is further entitled to permanent partial impairment benefits based
on $171.00 per week for 21.84 weeks (7% of 312 weeks), which would equal a
total of $3,734.64 for permanent partial impairment benefit.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The defendant corporation should pay the applicant the sum set forth
above.
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ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants pay the applicant $3,810.50
for temporary total disability compensation and $3,734.64 for permanent
partial impairment benefits and $6,114.76 to the medical providers for medical
costs plus any costs which might have been incurred subsequent to the date of
that calculation period.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of this accident, in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Steven Farr, attorney for the applicant,
be paid the sum of $1,509, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Keith E. Sohm
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah^ Salt Lake City, Utah, this
^<^
day of November, 1984.
ATTEST:

'"Linda J. SXp^rsburg
Commission/Secretary
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1 certify that on November
, 1984 a copy of the attached
ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Bret D. Kimbal
3821 Eccles Ave.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Steven W. Farr
Attorney at Law
205 26th St., Suite 34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Brill Sevy, dba Bigfoot's
3197 Wall Ave.
Ogden, Utah 84403
V David J. Knowlton
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1579
Ogden, Utah 84402
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